[This is part of a discussion I had on the Stormwatch BBS in 1995 with Hammad Ahmad Hussain. Though there are many deeper discussions of these issues, I thought this might be a good introduction for those unfamiliar with Objectivist discourse. This being a fragment of a discussion -- I can't find the rest -- it might seem a bit unfair to Hammad, but I hope that he and my readers will consider that my response to him is not the last word on the subject. I'm open as well to continuing this discussion with him or others as time permits.]
Hammad Ahmad Hussain: I don't see why you require that the virtues be mutually exclusive.
Daniel Ust: Obviously, since all the virtues are species of rationality, none of them can mutually exclude rationality. By analogy, to drive my point home, all cats are mammals, but dogs and cats are mutually exclusive species of mammals.
The point was not that I require the virtues to be mutually exclusive -- just that it would be helpful if all the species of rationality were. Why? Because then it would be a simple matter to generate a complete list of virtues merely by exhausting all the principled ways rationality can be applied to various areas of thought and action. It would settle some important questions now being asked by Objectivists, such as "Is 'civility' a virtue?"
Hammad: Rationality is the primary virtue and the derivatives are various applications of rationality. Thus, as [Leonard] Peikoff stated in OPAR [Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand], the virtues are necessarily interdependant and one cannot consistantly practice one without practicing the others...
Daniel: I don't question Peikoff. In fact, I agree. However, for the sake of conceptualizing virtues, we do separate them, just as we separate color from shape when we wish to understand it better. In practice, the rational man can't be honest without integrity or unproductive but independent -- in the same way that color does not exist without shape or intensity.
Hammad: Why define virtues which overlap?
Daniel: I doubt that Peikoff and others starting out to define virtues that overlap. In fact, the major virtues in Peikoff's short list (independence, integrity, etc.) are pretty much mutually exclusive. I'm just wondering whether other lists of virtues are merely rehashes of this list or actually different virtues altogether. (Please don't say all virtues are part of rationality. I agree, but that's not the issue here.) That was the point of my search for exhaustiveness. Peikoff doesn't address the point and makes no claim that his virtues are the only ones. (Correct me if I'm wrong!)
Aside from the example above -- i.e., of civility -- David Kelley claims that reponsibility is a virtue. To me, it seems to be a combination of some of Peikoff's virtues. Responsibility seems to point to independence, integrity, and productiveness. My question here would be Is responsibility just another way of saying "independent, having integrity and being productive?" If so, then why bother with it? It doesn't really bring up any new points -- except perhaps that these three virtues have a special relationship, though I tend to think that other virtues might be combined in such ways.
Another example from Kelley is "benevolence." He claims it's a virtue. Again, is it? Or is it merely the "sense of life" outcome of practicing the other virtues? Let me explain. Benevolence seems to me more a feeling than a principled way of acting. However, I can see how it might affect one's actions. Such as, if you feel good about life, the universe and everything, you are less likely to treat other people like dirt or to constantly look for faults and corruptions wherever you go. That seems nice, but is Kelley right in including among the virtues.
Even if these examples are wrong, the issue still remains.
Hammad: (1) To guide cognition. As per OPAR, one forms the concept of 'identity' even though it subsumes the same units as 'existence' because it, 'identity,' guides cognition in a different way than 'existence,' and is thus useful, semantically, in different contexts. The same is true of the three Aristotelian formulations of 'identity': non-contradiction, either-or (or excluded middle) and A is A.
Daniel: See my above comments on separating virtues and qualities for separate study.
Hammad: (2) For the PURPOSE of overlapping them. This makes it clear in one's mind that the virtues are mutually dependent, but NOT synonymous, and thus not individually self-sufficient means to the value of life; that one cannot practice one without practicing the others, i.e., that one must be FULLY moral.
Daniel: The issue here is not the didactic one of learning the virtues, but whether what I claim is so or not. I agree, the virtues cannot in practice be isolated.
Hammad: As to holding Conceptualization, Self-Motivation (is that what this person said? I don't recall his exact wording. Maybe I should have quoted.), and Achievement & Enjoyment as the cardinal values -- this just seems like an approximate rewording of Reason, Purpose, and Self-Esteem.
Daniel: I don't think Peter Saint-Andre four cardinal values may be an "approximate rewording" of Rand's three. (Saint-Andre's were: conceptualization, self-determination, achievement and enjoyment.) Jonathan Cargan made the same claim a few months back at a Central Jersey Objectivists meeting. Cargan believed "Reason" was equivalent to "conceptualization"; "Purpose" to "self-determination" and "achievement"; and "Self-Esteem" to "enjoyment." I believe Rand's three are on different conceptual levels than his. Also, his defense pretty much shows he does think hers and his are the same.
My gripe with Rand's trio is that they seem to be on different conceptual levels. Reason names a faculty that must, because it is a faculty, have a purpose. In fact, any action or thought has a purpose. This seems to show that "Purpose" is not on the same level as "Reason." "Self-Esteem" seems to be an emotional response. It might be better to say one doesn't pursue self-esteem, so much as it's the emotional outcome of successful living. I'll have to study this matter further.
Saint-Andre's argument is a little more sophisticated than merely generating more cardinal values. He states Rand's "triad (which might be better characterized as reason, HAPPINESS, and self-esteem) cannot, I believe, effectively function as a set of principles guiding choice and action. After all reason is a faculty, happiness is a state (or purpose is a choice), and self-esteem is a belief." ("A Philosophy for Living on Earth" in Objectivity 1(6), p152)
He argues for his cardinal values in three ways. The first is to scan Rand for evidence of them. He provides several quotes that seem to show that Rand implicitly accepted his four. For example, in _Atlas Shrugged_, she states, "all the cardinal values of [man's] existence are... reason, morality, creativeness, and joy." I haven't had any luck tracking down this quote, since I have a paperback edition of that book. However, it doesn't so much matter whether Rand knew it or not.
The second argument he uses is that they answer four "metaphysical value-questions": 1. Is human consciousness efficacious? (Can I know reality?) 2. Is human volition efficacious? (Can I make choices?) 3. Is human agency efficacious? (Can I achive goals in reality?) 4. Is there an emotional reward for causal efficacy? (Can I find joy in life?) (p151-2)
The third way he offers "is to look at the each cardinal value as a special kind of relation to reality, a relation that a living entity acts to acquire or maintain by applying some essential attribute of itself." (p154) To elaborate: "conceptualization as a relation ... to reality that I act to acquire or maintain by making the excercise of conceptual consciousness a way of life; self-determination as a relation to my identity an values ... that I act to acquire and maintain by making the excersize of volition a way of life; achievement as a relation of my intended future that I act to acquire and maintain by making the excersize of agency a way of life; and enjoyment as a relation to my causal efficacy ... that I act to acquire and maintain by making the emotional experience of joy a way of life." (p154-5)
Hammad: I understand the problem, however. It is probably possible to hold a completely different set of rationally justified cardinal values...
Daniel: I think that's not the problem at all. The problem is that Rand's trio is not a valid alternative if Saint-Andre is correct. If he is, then her trio -- Reason, Purpose, Self-Esteem -- are at best a foreshadowing of his four cardinal values -- conceptualization, self-determination, achievement and enjoyment.
How do you justify Rand's trio?
Hammad: If such is the case, however, the problem becomes validating, if possible, Reason, Purpose, and Self-Esteem, as the best combination of cardinal values. This I think can be done: I believe the key lies in showing the superior "unit-economy" of this approach as opposed to any other combined with showing that the three together are the best possible means to the value of life (though, again, I'm not sure; this is merely a lead, not a solution).
Daniel: You are groping. I think Saint-Andre is correct. The real question here is not one of trying to defend Rand, but of attaining the truth. Saint-Andre's four appear to be much more tightly intertwined with metaphysics (relying on relationships to reality) and ethics (relying on Rand's definition of value). I think his have an economy hers lacks. Also, his speaks to my gripe about the differing conceptual levels of hers.