[Though the idea stated below come from other sources, I'd like to thank Larry Sechrest's "Rand, Anarchy, and Taxes" ( The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 1(1)) for the proximate impetus to write this short piece. As many of you know, I'm sympathetic toward anarchism, though my concern in this area is more with living in a free and open society – rather than whether that society is anarchist or minarchist. (I mention this because a few years ago I fancied myself an anarchist.)]
In his "Freedom vs. Anarchy," Lindsay Perigo attacks anarchism in all too typical Objectivist fashion. He uses a fairly simple declaration: that there would be no agreed on legal standards in an anarchist society. Implied in this claim is the view that lacking such a standard would result in might makes right – "he who has the bigger club" would decide. In other words, absent government, freedom cannot exist. (Another assumption here is that freedom requires uniform legal standards.)
There are two problems with this argument. This is that it assumes legal standards can only be enforced from the top down, that without one final arbiter, there can be no agreement on standards. The other is that it assumes that only a government can arrive at the correct standard – or, to be charitable, at better (more tolerable?) standard than can be had otherwise.
The first problem is easily dispatched. Current nation states agree on standards even when they maintain their sovereignty. Surely, we do get some nations who do not agree to such, just as we have dissenters inside nation states who do not agree with a given nation's government's standards. (I daresay, the Libertarianz are just such dissenters vis-a-vis New Zealand's existing government.) But this disagreement does not mean that no agreement is possible. The fact that nation states form alliances, sign and enforce on themselves treaties and agreements as well as form transnational institutions at least demonstrates that an overarching government is not necessary.
If it is, then I submit, Perigo must advocate world and even universal government. He would not be alone in the Objectivist camp to suggest this, but it is notable that all serious attempts at world government have come from rampant statists – not classical liberals or libertarians. This should give pause.
But agreements between nation states are not the only evidence that standards can arise outside the scope of a government. If it were, then Perigo's argument would be weakened, but still tenable, given that governments also break treaties and agreements, defy institutions, and usually form alliances against other nations or alliances.
The fact is industries do agree to standards without government coercion. That's how ISO 9000 standards and Linux came about. No one signed these into law. Nor are these the only examples of such uncoerced standardization.
It might be claimed that these are trivial examples. Indeed, some might say, people and groups can agree on lots of things, but what about cases where disagreements will result not just in one person or company using different documentation standards or running a different operating system or eating lunch at two instead of noon, but in something more substantial? After all, having a different lunchtime might be an inconvenience, but typically it does not result in violence. Differing legal standards might mean the difference between someone having her property, her liberty, or even her life taken away.
For instance, someone claims a piece of property belongs to her, while another person claims the property is his. How would this be settled without a government? (Perigo might assume a government can solve this problem in a rational manner that respects actual rights. However, this asssumption needs to be proved. Plenty of cases of governments taking the wrong side in such disputes exist, from the seizure of Native American lands in the US after the Native Americans had won court battles over this (an example of one part of government acting inconsistently to another part) to current civil asset forfeitures (also in the US, but used elsewhere as well). The question should be: which is more effective and more efficient at settling disputes – not which can settle them.)
There exists an extensive literature on private dispute resolution with examples ranging from the Law Merchants of Late Middles Ages Northern Europe to modern mediation firms. (Benson 1990) Also, private dispute resolution seems to happen quite often when no government is around to resolve these questions. (Ellickson 1994) Most of these deal with property claims, but what about violent crimes, such as assault, rape, and murder? Others have treated this matter also. Benson illustrates how Anglo-Saxon judges resolved such issues in post-Roman/pre-Norman England. Rothbard (1973) and Friedman (1989) use the examples of Medieval Ireland and Iceland, respectively. While such cases and societes are by no means perfect, this should not damn them. After all, it would be wrong to claim anarchism must be perfect, while government need not meet that same standard.
George H. Smith has been one Objectivist-influenced philosopher who has put a theoretical foundation which Objectivists might relate to under anarchism. In his essay, Smith talks about how and why procedural rights would come about under anarchism. (Smith 1991)
Do these examples mean that anarchism works and will be able to replace government? That remains to be seen, though they should, at least, show that anarchism should not be categorically dismissed. (This is what makes Perigo's joke about Hegelians so bizarre. Hegelians, on the whole, are not for anarchism but for government. A "legally constituted police" is something most Hegelians would support. Though Rand was good at identifying the similarities in seeming opposites, this is merely an attempt at smearing anarchism (and possibly Hegel). In the end, if you live in a society with statists, no matter how good the laws and the government, eventually you will get statism.)
The rest of Perigo's article represents an attack on a particular anarchist's views rather than on the idea of anarchism per se. Rather than going after an easy target, he should see if notions like "objectivity" and "objective law" have meaning in a society without government. (Smith 1991)
Works Cited:
Bruce L. Benson. 1990. The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State. Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy: San Francisco.
Robert C. Ellickson. 1994. Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Harvard Univ Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.
David Friedman 1989 [1973]. The Machinery of Freedom: A Guide to Radical Capitalism. Open Court: Las Salle, Illinois.
Murray N. Rothbard. 1973. For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto. Macmillian: New York.
George H. Smith. 1991. "Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market" in Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies. Prometheus Books: Buffalo, New York.